Introduction
Health care expenditure has been soaring in all industrialized countries. The policy response has been of two types (Cutler, 2002) . Either outright rationing (hidden or open) was imposed, or health insurers were mandated to introduce policies with more stringent provisions (higher deductibles, higher rates of coinsurance, or so-called Managed Care options such as HMOs).
The United States has taken the latter route, resulting in more than two-third of the insured population being covered by some Managed Care alternative (Interstudy, 2003) . Other countries are considering the possibility of actually forcing consumers into Managed-Care type contracts. The common motive for these policies is that governments, who share (e.g. The objective of this paper is to present evidence on the likely magnitude of compensation required in a country whose citizens are accustomed to a great deal of choice in health care, similar to the United States. It reports on experiments involving the Swiss resident population that are designed to measure resistance against Managed-Care type restrictions in financial terms. The tool used is Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE), a novel approach to preference and willingness-to-pay measurement that is rapidly gaining acceptance. There are three main findings of this study: (1) Giving up free choice of physician requires one-third of the present average insurance premium to be voluntarily accepted, a high but finite amount, contradicting traditional ideology of the Swiss (and other) medical associations claiming free choice of physician to be priceless; (2) The combination of restrictions typically imposed by Managed
Care requires superadditive compensation, much as predicted by microeconomic theory; (3)
There is strong evidence of preference heterogeneity, suggesting that uniform regulation of the provision of health care may impose a substantial efficiency loss on the population of even a small country such as Switzerland with its 7.2 mn. inhabitants.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the second section, DCE are introduced as a tool for preference measurement. A short literature review concerning the merits of DCE compared to the conventional contingent valuation (CV) alternative will be given, followed by some theoretical background for econometric specification. The third section informs about the design of the present experiment. The attributes of health care provision that are relevant to consumers must be identified and levels found that while not deemed unrealistic induce respondents to switch between the status quo and the alternatives proposed. Otherwise, nothing can be learned about their preferences. A description of the sample is also given. The fourth section contains the econometric estimates. The starting point is a basic model that links respondents' change in utility simply to the differences in attributes between the status quo and the proposed alternatives without admitting any systematic heterogeneity in terms of marginal utilities of income. In a second step, socio-economic influences enter the picture, providing evidence of marked heterogeneity of preferences not only between language regions but also age and income groups. The final section presents conclusions and suggestions for future work.
DCE as a tool for preference measurement

Literature review
The method of choice for evaluating goods that are either public or not yet on the market is cost-benefit-analysis. Rather than relying on the human capital approach (which is not compatible with standard microeconomics (see e.g. Zweifel and Breyer, 1997, ch. 2), researchers increasingly determine the utility side of the equation using willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates. Sometimes it is possible to infer these preferences from individual behavior on the market. However, often recourse must be had to actually asking individuals about their WTP. Here, the traditional approach, pioneered in environmental economics and transportation economics, has been CV (see e.g. the survey by Mitchell and Carson, 1989 ).
The problem with CV is that all attributes of the alternative in question are kept constant, except price, which is rather artificial since in real life situations, available alternatives almost always differ from the status quo in several attributes. This artificiality of CV has several unwanted consequences (see Mitchell and Carson, 1989 
Theoretical background
Following Lancaster (1966) , the basic assumption is that consumers derive utility from the attributes they enjoy through the use of goods rather than from the quantity of goods per se.
Therefore, the utility of consumer i who exclusively consumes good j can be written as
Here, U denotes the utility, whose value is determined by a function that is identical for all individuals i, x j the quantity of good x in alternative j, b j the associated vector of attributes, z the numéraire good, and s i socioeconomic characteristics of individual i. Finally, ε ij is a random variable that reflects the fact that while decisions may be deterministic, their determinants cannot be fully observed by the experimenter, which imparts a stochastic element to decision making. This specification amounts to the random utility model (McFadden, 1974) . Due to utility maximization, the indirect utility function v ij can be written 
Stochastic specification
The usual assumption now is that indirect utility v j can be split up in a systematic and a stochastic component (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1983, chap. 3), ( , , , , ) ( , , , )
Now consumer i will decide in favor of alternative j if the utility associated with j exceeds the value associated with the status quo. Therefore, if P ij denotes the probability of choosing alternative j, one has
For alternative j to be chosen, the systematic utility difference therefore must exceed the purely chance-driven difference. Implementation of this criterion requires the specification of a joint density function for the stochastic term, defined over the set of scenarios. The multivariate normal distribution (Probit) has the advantage over extreme value distributions that in the multivariate case, the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives need not be imposed. Therefore, the (computationally more demanding) less restrictive Probit alternative is used in the following. In addition, a linear approximation of the systematic part of the utility function has been shown to usually be of sufficient precision in several empirical studies (Louviere et al., 2000, ch. 4). In the present context, generalizing the specification to include quadratic terms did not result in an improved statistical fit. The point of departure therefore will be an indirect utility function that is linear in the retained product attributes,
where the β are parameters to be estimated, the b the attributes (k = 1, …, K) except the insurance premium proposed in scenario j, 
If the WTP for the modification of several (or all) attributes has to be calculated, these WTP values are simply summed over all K attributes (Johnson and Desvousges, 1997), For the DCE, the following attributes were retained after extensive consultations with health insurance and medical experts. A crucial characteristic of Managed-Care plans is restricted physician choice. The most stringent alternative is for the health insurer to select providers using but cost criteria by limiting its list to those who do not exceed the average of cost per case by a certain multiple (PHYSCOST = 1, status quo = 0). Another, less harsh variant is to use quality criteria such as specialty training completed and continued education effort (PHYSQUAL = 1). Finally, the insurer may mimic the efficiency criterion its clientele observes according to economic theory by checking a physician's quality-cost ratio (PHYSEFF = 1). 
Currently in medical treatment
Yes 31%
Insurers also claim that granting access to new therapies and drugs with a lag of two years services is only covered to the extent that they are strictly medical whereas accommodation in a nursing home must be paid by the elderly person in principle (with social assistance making up for the gap if the pension is insufficient). The proposal is to make individuals aged 50 and more pay a monthly surcharge of CHF 50 (US$ 38) to finance a LTC supplement (LTC = 1). Finally, small district hospitals are believed not to be cost efficient; therefore, a contract excluding them in favor of larger units at the regional level should achieve some savings (HOSP = 1). The price attribute is the monthly premium that goes along with a contract defined by a combination of these attributes (PREMIUM).
Econometric results
Specification comprising attributes only
Although the theoretical example of section 2 involved coverage for LTC (see Figure 1 again), this attribute turned out not to be positively valued. It will therefore be left out of the discussion in the following. However, physician choice (the other attribute used in Figure 1) does constitute a highly valued attribute. This can be gleaned from table 2, which shows the results of the regression implementing the specification of equation (5). All retained attributes have the expected sign and are highly significant.
Conclusion 2:
The retained attributes are (with the exception of generic substitution and exclusion of drugs for minor complaints) highly significant determinants of contract choice and hence indirect utility. χ 2 (9) = 573.65; Prob > χ 2 = 0.0000
Likelihood ratio test of ρ = 0: χ 2 (1) = 1487.86; Prob > = χ 2 = 0.000 * (**, ***) Coefficient differs from zero at the 5% (1%, 0.1%) significance level.
From the estimated coefficients shown in Table 2 , WTP values (or rather, compensation values, often called willingness to accept) can be calculated. The results for four envisaged regulatory restrictions are displayed in Table 3 . To put these estimates in perspective, note that the nationwide average premiums as of 2003 is CHF 270 (US$208). The standard errors are calculated using the Delta method. Reading table 3 horizontally first, one notes that the amounts of compensation asked are consistently highest for consenting to a physician list based exclusively on cost criteria (PHYSCOST). The sample average is as high as CHF 103, or some 38 percent of the country's average monthly premium. Still, the fact that it is finite speaks against the claim (often advanced by medical associations worldwide) that free choice of physician is virtually priceless.
If insurers were to select participating physicians according to quality criteria (PHYSQUAL), compensations required drop by some 50 percent on average to CHF 53 (and even 60 percent among those aged 25-39, to CHF 33). This does not come as a surprise in a highly insured system, where a low rate of coinsurance (10 percent on ambulatory care) encourages patients to emphasize quality in their choices. However, the drop in compensation asked is even more marked if the envisaged criteria for selecting physicians are both quality and cost, which amounts to an efficiency criterion (PHYSEFF). This may be astonishing at first sight;
however, PHYSEFF implies that the insurer would be applying exactly the same criteria as consumers, the only difference being that insured consumers would use net cost (after insurance) rather than full cost. The health insurer therefore would come close to acting as a perfect agent whose decisions should meet with little resistance by principals.
Delaying access to new therapies and drugs by two years (col. 4) would have to be compensated very highly, too. This makes sense because this is a restriction that applies across the board, regardless of the type of therapy (pharmaceutical vs. medical) and the setting (ambulatory care vs. hospital care). By way of contrast, a drug benefit restricted to generics if available (col. 5) does not even call for a compensation within certain subgroups.
There are two likely reasons for this. First, generic drug substitution has been enjoying an increasing degree of acceptance, and second, relatively few original drugs have admitted generic substitutes in Switzerland (their market share being less than 5 percent), which means that the corresponding restriction would not be binding very often. When it comes to do without reimbursement of drugs that help against minor complaints (col. 6) the Swiss population even seem to exhibit a small positive WTP for such a restriction. This can be interpreted as an instance of 'warm glow', i.e. the tendency of (at least some) respondents to choose alternatives they believe to be socially acclaimed (Andreoni, 1995) . This 'warm glow' effect already disappears, however, with those more likely affected (currently in treatment) exhibiting a positive average amount of compensation asked. Finally, compensation necessary to make the insured accept having their choice of hospital restricted (by closing inefficient small local units, col. 7) attains values that come close to those of col. 3
(physician list on efficiency criteria). Once more, this has an economic interpretation. On the one hand, an illness calling for hospitalization usually is well beyond a minor complaint, justifying higher values than those of col. 6 of Table 3 . Also, substitution of a central for a local hospital quite likely entails a greater sacrifice than substituting a generic for a branded drug (col. 5) in these urgent circumstances. On the other hand, the technology available in the two types of hospital is roughly comparable, whereas lacking access to the newest medical and pharmaceutical technologies for two years may entail a marked loss of quality of life in some situations, a fact that is compatible with the values of col. 7 falling somewhat short of those shown in col. 4 of Table 3 .
When reading Table 3 vertically, one finds clear evidence of preference heterogeneity. Not surprisingly, regulation restricting physician choice on cost criteria (col. 1 of Table 3 ) would meet with particularly strong resistance among the 65+ age group and those having been in hospital recently. Compensations demanded are 46 and 55 percent higher than average, respectively. However, the most salient heterogeneity seems to be a cultural one in that the French-speaking minority exhibits a value that exceeds the average by even 85 percent.
Similar but even more marked differences emerge with regard to the other restrictions of physician choice proposed. For example, when it comes to a selection based on efficiency criteria (col. 3), the French-speaking require even more than the triple of the average amount of monthly compensation (CHF 136 vs. 42) for acceptance. When it comes to delayed access to new therapies and drugs (col. 4), this would be resisted most strongly by the 40-64 years old rather than the oldest and among individuals with high income (4000+ CHF per month).
This is less of a surprise than the observation that the compensation necessary to overcome such a regulatory measure would again have to be twice as high for the French-speaking than for the German-speaking population. In relative terms, this cultural divide is at least as marked when it comes to accepting generics rather than original drugs and to do without reimbursement of drugs that help against minor complaints (col. 5 and 6).
Finally, preference heterogeneity shows up importantly again in col. 7 of Table 3 . In spite of a hospital density of 0.8 per 10,000 population, one of the highest figures of the world (OECD, 2003), women are willing to pay the substantial amount of an estimated CHF 48 (US$ 37) per month to preserve access to local hospitals. This is understandable because of the importance of maternity services to them. Apart from the language divide, those having experienced hospital treatment during the recent past tend to also have higher WTP for continued access to local hospitals.
Conclusion 3:
Socioeconomic characteristics are associated with marked differences in required compensations for regulatory restrictions that are interpretable in terms of economic theory. Moreover, regional differences point to considerable preference heterogeneity that likely is culturally determined.
Resistance against combined restrictions
Reforms of the healthcare sector usually proceed in packages which amount to a combination of cutbacks (Cutler, 2003) . To the extent that the restrictions considered in the present paper all amount to a loss of freedom of choice, the convexity of the indifference curve can be used to infer that compensation asked for two restrictions combined will exceed the sum of the compensations for each measure separately (see Figure 1 again). amounts to CHF 199 (=103 + 65 -6 + 37). However, combined restrictions do require superadditive compensation without exception. This is importantly due to the fact that when combining attributes to a product, the constant of eq. (6) enters the calculation. A changing constant can impart proximate convexity to the indifference curve (which is locally linearized in the Probit estimation of Table 2 ). In sum, the estimates shown in Table 4 suggest that piecemeal regulation may meet with less resistance than entire packages, at least in the case of health care.
Dispersion of WTP estimates
An important piece of evidence regarding preference heterogeneity is provided by an analysis of the distribution of WTP estimates. As shown in Table 5 Preference heterogeneity is even more marked with regard to a physician list based on efficiency criteria (PHYSEFF). Here, the average WTP value is 42, while it falls to a mere CHF 10 (roughly 25 percent of the mean) for the lowest decile of the distribution. 
Conclusions
Regulation tends to burden both producers and consumers with efficiency losses.
Nevertheless, it may be justified if it helps to avoid or reduce externalities. In this case, observing market behavior for inferring efficiency losses constitutes an imperfect guide for policy. In the context of health care, the externality to be considered is moral hazard, which can be controlled by imposing restrictions on the choice of health care providers and therapies covered by insurance. Therefore, it may be inappropriate to use observed behaviour of patients and healthcare providers for designing reforms. When such restrictions are in the planning stage, behavior under regulation cannot be observed. In this situation, the use of experiments simulating market behavior can provide valuable guidance.
The discrete choice experiments reported here have the advantage of realism (Conclusion 1).
They are realistic because respondents had to decide between a fixed status quo and a series of alternatives that change in all relevant product attributes, not only price (as in contingent valuation). They are realistic also because under the pressure of competition, insurers who successfully control moral hazard (thus achieving a cost advantage) will have to offer lower premiums. In the case of Switzerland, this scenario is credible because contracts already exist that offer a premium reduction in return for certain restrictions of the managed-care type (Lehmann and Zweifel, 2004) . It may be this realism that contributed to a very low rate of refusals in the experiment and clear evidence in favor of trade-offs between non-price and price attributes of the proposed alternatives.
The great majority of the regulatory restrictions considered do impart utility losses to respondents (Conclusion 2). Compensations required to make respondents voluntarily accept these restriction can be shown to importantly differ between groups. The highest compensation asked pertains to restrictions of physician choice; however these amounts are finite, and at least for some segments of the insured population, the achievable cost savings suffice to finance them. In particular, this refutes the claim often advanced by the medical profession that free physician choice is virtually priceless. Indeed, immediate access to new therapies and drugs seem to command a comparable value, at least in the case of the Swiss population.
To the extent that the aged may be exposed to increased health risk, against which they want to buy health insurance coverage, microeconomic theory predicts their compensation to be higher than average (Arrow, 1971, ch. 3 ). This prediction is borne out in all the variants of physician lists considered here. While no economic predictions can be made regarding the ceteris paribus-difference between the German-speaking and French-speaking regions, the fact that compensations asked are up to five times higher in the French-speaking region point to a great deal of preference heterogeneity. Turning to income, the general pattern conforms to economic predictions in that higher income is associated with higher compensation asked for a good such as freedom of choice, which must be particularly valuable when financial This preference heterogeneity militates against the introduction of regulation imposing uniform Managed-Care type policies on health insurers and hence consumers. Rather, insurers need the freedom to develop policies that match the preferences of subsets of the population, to whom they are able to offer a premium reduction corresponding to the amount of compensation asked for accepting the pertinent restrictions on the provision of health care.
